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CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION 
OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: 
TIME FOR A REAPPRAISAL 
K.G. Jan Pillai* 
Craig Tractenberg** 
Corporations and their regulators have considered at great 
length the propriety of indemnifying corporate executives for li-
ability and litigation expenses.1 The economic and policy impli-
cations of indemnification have assumed such importance in re-
cent years, though, as to merit reexamination of the permissible· 
limits of the practice. In 1980 alone, one of every ten Fortune-
listed companies2 confronted litigation seeking personal liability 
against either a director or an officer,8 with a substantial number 
of claims being brought by stockholders alleging mismanage-
ment or other breaches of fiduciary duty." As corporate execu-
• Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. B.A., L.L.M., 1965, Kerala Uni-
versity, India; L.L.M., 1967, J.S.D., 1969, Yale University. 
•• Associate, Abraham, Pressman & Bauer, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A., 
1978, LaSalle College; J.D., 1981, Temple University School of Law. 
1. See Bates & Zuckert, Directors' Indemnity: Corporate Policy or Public Policy?, 20 
HARV. Bus. REV. 244 (1942). Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., has been at the forefront of 
the entire corporate indemnification issue and has authored many instructive works on 
the subject. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIPYING THE CORPORATE ExEcUTIVE 
n963); Bishop, Current Status of Corporate Directors' Right to Indemnification, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1956); Bishop, New Cure For an Old Ailment: Insurance Against 
Directors' and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAW 92 (1966); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and 
Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 
77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968); Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, Liabilities Which Can Be Cov-
ered Under State Statutes and Corporate By-Laws, 27 Bus. LAw, Feb. 1972 Special 
Issue, at 109; Bishop, Protecting Corporate Executives Against Liability and Expense 
Under the Federal Securities Law: Potential Liability, in PROTECTING THE CORPORATE 
OFFICER AND DIRECTOR FRoM LIABILITY 155 (PLI Course Handbook Series No. 25, 1969). 
2. Fortune-listed companies are the 1300 domestic companies listed annually in For-
tune Magazine; they comprise the 1000 largest industrials plus the 50 largest each among 
banks and diversified financial, life insurance, retail, transportation, and utility 
companies. 
3. THE WYATT Co., THE 1980 WYATT DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY AND FmucI-
ARY LIABILITY SURVEY 6 [hereinafter cited as 1980 WYATT SURVEY]. The Wyatt Company 
surveyed 2247 United States corporations, 53% of them Fortune-listed, through a confi-
dential questionnaire which asked about losses arising from director and officer liability, 
the prevalence of insurance and claims, and their costs. References to "a single claini" 
means each class action suit or each group of similar clainiants bringing an action as a 
result of a single alleged occurrence. · 
4. Id. at 16. Of the 1980 claims, 40.3% were brought by stockholders. 
101 
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tives .become more vulnerable to litigation initiated by forces 
within the corporation, their desire increases for protective de-
vices, such as indemnification, which effectively can insulate 
them from personal liability.11 
In 1980, American corporations paid over fifty-two million 
dollars in director and officer insurance premiums.6 The preva-
lence of this insurance is understandable in light of the magni-
tude and incidence of the risks involved. More than one quarter 
of major publicly held domestic companies have had at least one 
claim against their executives between 1971 and 1980.7 In 1980, 
the average total claim cost8 resulting from indemnification was 
estimated to be almost one million dollars.9 Of this amount, the 
average defense cost was nearly $320,000 - · an increase of ap-
proximately seventy-five percent over 1974 defense costs.10 
The potentially crushing personal liability which may arise 
from these lawsuits11 creates a dilemma for the corporation: bal-
ancing the need for punishing the willing wrongdoer against the 
need to protect dynamic fiduciaries involved in good-faith efforts 
to increase profits. Corporate indemnification of executive risk 
and exposure thus becomes a matter of great public concern in 
seeking that middle ground where capable managers, subject to 
inordinate personal risk, are encouraged to serve, yet discour-
5. See Rout, Job of Corporate Director Becomes More Susceptible to Legal Assault, 
Wall St. J., March 3, 1981, at 33, col. 4. 
6. 1980 WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, table 28, at 73-75. See also Greenberg & Dean, 
Protecting the Corporate Executives: Director and Officer Liability Insurance Re-evalu-
ated, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 555, 556 n.3 (1975). 
Corporations prefer to purchase insurance and pay premiums, notwithstanding that 
claims covered by insurance legally could be reimbursed by the corporation out of its 
own loss reserves. 1980 WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 23-24. For the 19 companies 
responding to the survey that had assets aggregating over $2 billion and had policy limi-
tations of $50 million, the average premium paid in 1980 was $168,012. Id. Of the 51 ~o- of 
Fortune-listed companies participating in the survey, 93% purchase D & 0 policies to 
protect their executives. In 1980, 95.6% of New York Stock Exchange companies pur-
chased D & 0 insurance, compared to 70.4% in 1973. Similarly, D & 0 insurance cover-
age for American Stock Exchange companies increased to 89.3% in 1980, from 47% in 
1973. Id. at 41. 
7. 1980 WYATT SURVEY, supra note 3, at 7. About one in every 20 large companies 
(assets between $400 million and $1 billion) had at least one claim in any given year 
between 1971 and 1980. Id. at 9. 
8. The average total claim cost consists of the average annual loss to the corporation 
plus the expense of legal defenses, i.e., the total amount of all losses and all legal de-
fenses divided by the number of claims reported in the survey. Id. at 26. 
9. Id. at 27. . 
10. Id. at 12. The average total cost of successful claims was a staggering $1,196,000, 
of which $877,361 represents the average recovery by each claimant. 
11. For comprehensive works on the subject of substantive liabilities of directors and 
officers, see M. FEUER, PERSONAL LJABILITIBS OP CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREcrORS (2d 
ed. 1974); W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OP CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREcroRS (2d ed. 1973). 
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aged from violating their positions of trust. 
This Article evaluates the benefits.and burdens of shifting liti-
gation risk from management to the enterprise. The Article be-
gins by considering the nature of the legal risks confronting the 
corporate executive, and the principles of common law that de-
veloped to counter those risks. The Article proceeds to assess 
the two statutory responses to threats of personal liability 
against the corporate executive: indemnification statutes, and di-
rector and officer insurance. Finally, after comparing the effec-
tive absolute immunity available to corporate executives with 
the qualified immunity enjoyed by high-level government offi-
cials, the Article concludes that indemnification practices have 
overinsulated the corporate officer from personal liability. 
I. LEGAL RISKS INHERENT IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 
Determining the appropriate allocation of the financial bur-
dens of indemnification should begin by identifying the sources 
of potential litigation and the scope of executive liability. Suits 
against corpora~ management commonly are grouped into three 
distinct categories:111 derivative suits, third-party suits, and sta-
tus suits. Derivative suits typically are brought on behalf of the 
corporation, third-party suits arise from executive conduct di-
rectly affecting third parties, and status suits originate from the 
breach of statutory duties imposed by virtue of executive status. 
A. The Derivative Action 
The most common legal risks facing the corporate executive 
arise from shareholder derivative actions.13 These actions are 
based upon an asserted wrong to the corporation, with the plain-
tiff seeking money damages or other relief for the benefit of the 
corporation.14 Corporate executives, absent indemnification, bear 
the brunt of the successful derivative action. A director or officer 
12. See Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and 
Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAW. 92 (1966). 
13. See generally 2 G. WASHINGTON & V.H. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THB CoRPo• 
RATE ExEcUTIVE 875-930 (3d ed. 1962). 
14. Typically, plaintiffs in derivative actions ar:e shareholders of the injured corpora• 
tion. But see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), 
wherein plaintiffs were not shareholders of the insolvent corporations but had standing 
to sue on behalf of an undercapitslized corporation for the benefit of the creditors of the 
insolvent corporation. 
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may be the target of a suit if he seizes a corporate opportunity,15 
engages in self-dealing with regard to compensation,16 reaps un-
reasonable reimbursement or payment of proxy expenses,17 or 
becomes entangled in stock repurchases by an issuing corpora-
tion.18 Derivative suits have been used successfully to attack de-
cisions of disinterested directors who engage in needless financ-
ing, 19 effect a merger in derogation of the statutory rights of 
dissenting shareholders,20 or adopt policies inconsistent with an-
titrust and trade regulation legislation.21 Merely refraining from 
conscious wrongdoing may not always suffice to insulate man-
agement from "honest negligence";22 even the most conscien-
tious director or officer may be found liable for conduct reasona-
bly regarded by him as ethical and prudent, especially where 
confusion exists among jurisdictions regarding the formulation 
of the business judgment rule, an affirmative defense to the de-
rivative action.23 . 
15. See, e.g., Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Kassab, 325 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1963); Irving Trust 
Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1934); Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See also Central Ry. Signal Co. v. 
Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952); Craig v. Graphic Arts Studio, Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 
447, 166 A.2d 444 (1960). 
16. See, e.g., Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seidman, 267 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); 
Dwyer v. Tracey, 118 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1954); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 263 A.D. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d.131 (1941); Indurated Concrete Corp. v. 
Abbott, 195 Md. 496, 74 A.2d 17 (1950); Stoiber v. Miller Brewing Co., 257 Wis. 13, 42 
N.W.2d 144 (1950). 
17. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 
N.E.2d 291 (1955); Neuwirth v. Feeley, 148 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1955), af/'d, 1 A.D.2d 
879, 150 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1956). See also Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 
N.E. 138 (1912); Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879). 
18. See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962). In regard to 
abusive stock repurchases, see SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6108, 18 SEc. 
DOCKET 67 (1979). 
19. E.g., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (failure to 
seek competitive bids for financing resulting in waste). 
20. E.g., Gilbert v. Burnside, 197 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd, 13 A.D.2d 982, 
216 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961), af/'d per curiam, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183 N.E.2d 325 (1962). 
21. E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 335, 182 A.2d 328 (1962). 
For the background of this case, see J. BROOKS, Bus1NEss ADVENTURES 199-223 (1969). 
See also Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953). 
22. Bishop, supra note 12, at 93. 
23. Plaintiff shareholders may be barred from suing derivatively if refusal of the pre-
requisite shareholder demand on directors was made in the exercise of their sound busi-
ness judgment. Ash v. International Business Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied., 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957); Issner 
v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 
P.2d 421 (1952); Brooks v. Brooks Pontiac, Inc., 143 Mont. 256, 389 P.2d 185 (1964); Rice 
v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 130 N.E.2d 442 {Ohio C.P. 1954); cf. Groel v. 
United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (1905) (business judgment is not a bar 
where a "grave doubt" exists as to fairmindedness of the judgment). As to jurisdictional 
confusion concerning the degree of care to be exercised by a fiduciary, see H. HENN, LAW 
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The major objection to indemnifying the corporate executive 
found liable in a derivative suit is that reimbursement violates 
the utility of this cause of action. Indemnification in this setting 
causes the corporation to repay the executive precisely the 
amount received as a result of the derivative action. 24 There may 
be less objection, however, to indemnification of settlement pay-
ments in derivative suits because the corporation can derive tan-
gible benefits from prompt resolution of the action. If the corpo-
ration wants to encourage rapid disposition of particularly 
refractory litigation, reimbursement of settlement payments 
may well be to its advantage. 215 
B. The Third-Party Action 
In contrast to the derivative action, executives may be 
threatened with litigation brought on the basis of contract or 
legislation rather than on behalf of the corporation itself.28 Such 
third-party actions often are difficult to distinguish from deriva-
tive suits. They arise, for instance, upon breach of the share-
holders' membership contract. A third party might also seek 
payment of lawfully declared27 and mandatory dividends,28 en-
forced inspection of corporate records,29 protection of preemp-
tive rights or other dilution of shareholders' proportional inter-
ests, 30 prohibition of wrongful redemptions, 31 or relief in proxy 
contests.32 Along with creditors and competitors of the corpora-
OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (2d ed. 1976). The standard lies between the severe standard of a 
common law trustee (the prudent man in the conduct of his own affairs), see Hun v. 
Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880), and a less exacting standard, see Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 
U.S. 132 (1891); see Comment, Public Policy and Director's Liability Insurance, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 716, 720 (1967). 
24. See Bishop, Indemnification of Corporate Directors, Officers and Employees, 20 
Bus. LAW. 833, 841 (1965). 
25. See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance, 33 Bus. LAW. 
1993, 2009 (1978). 
26. See H. HENN, supra note 23, at § 360. 
27. E.g., Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 17 F.R.D. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 
717 (3d Cir. 1956); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914); 
In re Booth, 139 Misc. 253, 248 N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1931). 
28. E.g., Boardman v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 84 N.Y. 157 (1881); Koppel v. Middle 
States Petroleum Corp., 272 A.D. 790, 69 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1947). 
29. E.g., In re Hauser v. Hopewell Products, Inc., 10 A.D.2d 876, 201 N.Y.S.2d 252 
(1960); Hagy v. Premier Mfg. Corp., 404 Pa. 330, 172 A.2d 283 (1961). 
30. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F. Supp. 
99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Sheppard v. Wilcox, 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1963). 
31. E.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Lehrman v. 
Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 207 Misc. 314, 138 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
32. E.g., Campell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957). 
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tion, the government frequently initiates third-party actions, 
such as criminal antitrust proceedings, 33 and suits involving 
tax:3'' and securities regulations.35 Commentators foresee devel-
opment of additional causes of action grounded particularly 
upon infringement of civil rights and the failure of corporations 
to comply with federal standards governing safety and hiring 
practices.38 Actions to enjoin a proposed merger or consolida-
tion, sale of assets, or dissolution have been permitted as either 
derivative or third-party actions. Actions to compel dissolution, 
however, hardly benefit the dissolving business entity and there-
fore are classified as third-party actions.37 
Indemnification for the defense of a third-party action seems 
eminently justifiable. The great potential for strike suits38 cre-
ates a legitimate need to protect both individual executives and 
the corporate image. Also, third-party actions commonly involve 
no breach of duties owed to the corporation, making indemnifi-
cation more palatable than it might be in a derivative suit. 
C. The Status Suit 
The corporate executive confronts a third category of litiga-
tion risk imposed by virtue of his status.39 Federal securities 
laws create such status obligations by requiring special conduct 
of corporate fiduciaries towards third parties. Perhaps the best 
example of status liability is that imposed by section 16(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. •0 
Section 16(b) provides that a corporate issuer of securities 
may recapture any profits41 - arising within six months after 
the sale or purchase of those securities - that are realized by an 
officer, director, or ten-percent-beneficial owner of the corpora-
tion. Whether these profits are engendered by inside informa-
33. E.g., Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 279 A.D. 996, 112 N.Y.S.2d 146 
(1952), atf'd, 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953). 
34. E.g., United States v. Fox, 95 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Du Puy v. Crucible 
Steel Co., 288 F. 583 (W.D. Pa. 1923). 
35. See Bishop, supra note 12, at 95. 
36. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 558. 
37. See H. HENN, supra note 23, at § 361. 
38. A "strike suit" is brought solely for the purpose of harassing management, in the 
hope of a direct payoff to the stockholder plaintiff. Bishop, supra note 12, at 94. 
39. Id. at 95. 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). 
41. Profits are maximized by matching the lowest priced purchases against the high-
est priced sales. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 
(1951) (judgment against defendant for reconstructed profit despite actual loss of 
$300,000). 
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tion is immaterial;42 sectionl6(b) has been termed a "Russian 
Roulette" provision, for it often applies to reproachless 
situations:'3 
Status liability results also from implied civil actions under 
Securities Act of 1934 section lO(b), and rule IOb-5." These pro-
visions impose special duties on insiders to disclose material in,. 
side information, or to abstain from market disruption, for the 
purpose of prohibiting fraud, deceit, or the use of a manipulative 
device in connection with the sale or purchase of securities."5 Li-
ability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933"8 may be 
imposed where a director fails to make an adequate "due dili-
gence" search before the requisite signing of a registration state-
ment to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in connection with a public offering of securities."7 ' 
The federal securities laws likely did not contemplate creation 
of status liability in excessive amounts. Corporate executives, 
however, quickly realized the potential for substantial legal ex-
penses arising from suits brought under the various federal stat-
utes. Thus, in an effort to minimize the impact of status suits, as 
well as to avoid crushing liability arising from derivative and 
third-party actions, corporate executives sought common law 
rules favoring indemnification. 
JI. INDEMNIFICATION AT COMMON LAW 
Principles of agency constituted the most appropriate vehicle 
at common law for granting the corporate executive relief from 
liability. These common law principles, however, while entitling 
42. Maqida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 
(1956). 
43. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 1036 (1970) (holding Martin Marietta Corp. liable as an inside director of Sperry 
Rand Corp.). 
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1981). The scope of rule l0b-5 
has been narrowed by judicial interpretation. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
45. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968). 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). 
47. See Escott v. Bar Chris Constr., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding a 
signatory to a false registration statement personally liable for losses suffered by deben-
ture holders, notwithstanding that he had not been a director for 48 hours prior to the 
filing). 
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an agent to exoneration"s from the principal for damages in-
curred in the performance of authorized duties, did not permit 
indemnification of expenses incurred in all types of corporate lit-
igation. 49 The common law rule was particularly inadequate in 
failing to provide reimbursement to the agent who successfully 
def ended a suit brought by the principal itself. 110 Thus, the law 
of agency stands reticent regarding the most recurring problem 
posed by derivative actions: whether, and under what circum-
stances, there can be indemnification of the executive acting as 
agent who presents a successful defense against the corporation 
as principal. 
In derivative actions decided under common law principles, 
courts uniformly have denied reimbursement to unsuccessful 
corporate defendants.111 Since the earliest cases, however, actions 
involving successful defendants have proved more problematic. 
Because the successful defense of a derivative action rarely, if 
ever, will directly benefit the defeated corporation, the early 
courts struggled with the conflict between the equitable notion 
of reimbursement and the axiom that corporate funds should be 
expended only if tangible benefits would accrue to the corpora-
tion. As a result, some courts granted indemnification;112 others 
denied it, absent unanimous shareholder approval, unless the 
corporate directors seeking indemnification could show "some 
48. For the purposes of discussion, no legal distinction of exoneration is made be-
tween direct corporate payments to defense counsel and reimbursement of executives for 
out-of-pocket payments. 
49. See Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 498 (1893); Differential Steel Car Co. v. Macdon-
ald, 180 F.2d 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1950); Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi, 60 Cal. 2d 834, 
389 P.2d 133, 36 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Cal. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 439(c) 
(1957); Johnston, supra note 25. 
50. See Cory Bros. & Co. v. United States, 51 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1931); Buckley v. 
City of New York, 170 Misc. 412, 415, 10 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 264 A.D. 
116, 34 N.Y.S.2d 577, aff'd, 289 N.Y. 742, 46 N.E.2d 352 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY§ 438, comment l (1958); G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 95 & 
n.63. 
51. See, e.g., McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 F. 103 (8th Cir. 1906); Wickersham v. 
Crittenden, 106 Cal. 329, 39 P. 603 (1895); Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, 109 Me. 403, 
84 A. 892 (1912). 
52. See, e.g., Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1906), where a director 
sought recovery, in his capacity as stockholder, from other members of the board for 
fraud and misapplication of corporate funds. Although not strictly speaking a derivative 
action, the suit nonetheless was brought for the benefit of the corporation. The court 
sustained, without discussion or citation of authority, the use of corporate funds to pay 
the expenses of directors during trial and before exoneration, reasoning that "if no case 
is made against defendants it is not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay 
for the defense of the action." Id. at 625, 109 N.W. at 592. But cf. Jesse v. Four Wheel 
Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N.W. 276 (1922) (holding that corporate funds could 
not be used to defend directors in litigation involving their personal dealings with stock-
holders rather than their management of corporate affairs). 
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benefit to the corporation or that some interest of the corpora-
tion was threatened."118 
This confuson reached its peak in New York Dry Dock Com-
pany, Inc. v. McCollum/'' a decision denying reimbursement for 
expenses incurred in the successful defense of a derivative ac-
tion. The court found that the defendant directors had failed to 
carry their burden of establishing either that the suit had pre-
served a substantial corporate interest or had generated benefits 
for the corporation.1111 The McCollum decision, perceived as re-
jecting a common law right to reimbursement of expenses absent 
express legislative authorization, 116 caused panic in Albany and 
on Wall Street alike. Directorates scurried to amend corporate 
bylaws, execute employment contracts, and correspond with po-
litical representatives in an effort to circumvent the adverse con-
sequences of the decision.117 
Since the ;McCollum episode, the trend has been to recognize 
the rights of an innocent director to indemnification.118 For ex-
ample, the New Jersey case of Solimine v. Hollander"9 granted 
53. Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 558, 175 N.E. 222, 223 (1931); see Drivas v. 
Lekas, 182 Misc. 567, 48 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 
222, 39 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1942). These courts apparently failed to recognize the 
wide range of benefits that might cause a corporation to indemnify its executives, espe-
cially the benefit of indemnification in inducing competent executives to accept corpo-
rate positions. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 87; Frampton, Indemni-
fication of Insiders' Litigation Expenses, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. Paon., 325, 327-28 (1958). 
54. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The defendant's name is properly 
spelled "McCollom." G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 87 n.39. 
55. The suit, brought by the corporation against certain of its directors, was for a 
declaratory judgment to resist payment of their expenses. It was alleged that these direc-
tors had successfully defended a derivative suit brought against them and had success-
fully prevented the appointment of a receiver. The court held that the directors were not 
entitled to _reimbursement, for the following reasons: no disinterested approval of the 
reimbursement was obtained; no implied contract of Jaw required reimbursement; no 
corporate benefit was bestowed by the directors (referee found that dismissal of the peti-
tion for receivership was due to the sole efforts of corporate counsel); the settled state of 
the Jaw rejected any policy arguments in favor of indemnification; and it would have 
been more appropriate to bring the reimbursement claim before the trial judge in the 
original suit, who would be "in a much better position than any judge to evaluate the 
alleged benefits to the corporation of the legal services rendered." 173 Misc. at 113; 16 
N.Y.S.2d at 850; see G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 87-90. 
56. See Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct.), alf'd mem., 267 
A.O. 899, 48 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1943), aff'd mem., 293 N.Y. 735, 56 N.E.2d 739 (1944). Note 
that Bailey was decided subsequent to passage of the New York indemnification stat-
utes, chs. 209, 350, 1941 N.Y. LAWS 164th Sess. (current version at N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW 
§§ 722, 723 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981)). 
57. The result, only two years later, was the nation's first indemnification statute, 
drafted specifically to displace the effects of McCollum. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, 
supra note 1, at 87. 
58. See Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 895-98 (3d Cir. 1953). 
59. 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941). 
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indemnification on the theory that the defense and vindication 
of management itself constituted a benefit to the corporation, 
going so far as to repudiate the necessity to demonstrate corpo-
rate benefits where the director had been successful on the mer-
its. The court said: "[T]he right to reimbursement is a circum-
stance that would actuate and induce responsible business men 
to accept the post of directors, the emoluments of which would 
otherwise never be commensurate with the risk of loss involved 
in paying out of their own pocket the costs involved in defending 
their conduct."80 
Ill. INDEMNIFICATION STATUTES 
A. The Early Statutes 
Despite the clearly discernible common law trend favoring in-
demnification, the vast majority of states still found it prudent 
to enact special statutes granting the right or power of indemni-
fication.81 In response to the McCollum case,82 corporate execu-
tives induced legislative adoption of protective bylaw provisions 
and statutes68 assuring indemnification. Thus, almost all Ameri-
can jurisdictions, beginning with New York in 1941" and fol-
lowed by Delaware in 1943,811 have enacted statutes authorizing 
and regulating indemnification of litigation expenses incurred by 
corporate executives.88 
The statutes, as originally enacted, contained a number of de-
fects enabling untoward judicial interpretations. For instance, 
the old Delaware statute was flawed because merely permissive; 
it did not give the executive an enforceable right to be indemni-
60. Id. at 272, 19 A.2d at 348; accord, In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 214-15, 
45 N.W.2d 388, 393 (1950). 
61. S~e Mattar & Hilson, Exposure of Corporate Directors: An Oueruiew of Indemni-
fication and Liability Insurance, 46 J. RISK & INs. 411, 412 (1979). 
62. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra. 
63. See generally G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 112-205. 
64. Chs. 209, 350, 1941 N.Y. LAWS 164th Seas. {current version at N.Y. Bus. CoRP. 
LAW §§ 722, 723 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-1981)). 
65. Ch. 125, 44 Del. Laws 109th Sess. (1943) {current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 145(c) (1974)). 
66. Apparently state regulation was prompted by indemnification bylaws that aimed 
to grant management total immunity from personal liability. The public policy justifying 
statutory regulation arose out of bylaws permitting executives adjudged guilty in deriva-
tive actions to be indemnified for the very funds they had extracted from the corporate 
fisc. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of 
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1079 (1968). 
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fied. 67 Furthermore, the statute failed to distinguish between de-
rivative and third-party actions, thus seeming to forbid indemni-
fication in a third-party action when the executive was adjudged 
liable for actions done with intent to further corporate interests. 
The statute did not specifically cover criminal, administrative, 
or investigative proceedings, nor did it embrace counsel expenses 
incurred in threatened litigation. Finally, the defect most troub-
ling to executives in the old statutes, such as Delaware's, was the 
absence of an express provision dealing with compromise 
settlements. 68 
B. The Modern Statutes 
Through a series of amendments and revisions, state legisla-
tures sought to clarify the original indemnification statutes in 
order to cure the apparent deficiencies. Following the revision of 
the Model Business Corporation Act of 1967,69 the Delaware 
statute became a prototype for other states. An analysis of these 
statutes is needed for a clear understanding of the varying de-
grees of risks and liabilities to which corporate executives cur-
rently are exposed. 
Modern indemnification statutes may be divided into two 
broad categories: mandatory and permissive. Mandatory statutes 
require indemnification by corporations upon satisfaction of cer-
tain statutory prerequisites. This mandatory approach repre-
sents an improvement over earlier formulations because it pro-
vides an enforceable right against the corporate entity. 
Permissive statutes, in contrast, grant the corporation an option 
to indemnify its executives when specified conditions are met. 
While permissive statutes enable a corporation to guarantee in-
demnification by incorporating appropriate indemnification 
clauses in bylaws, charters, or employment contracts, such an 
option places undue emphasis on drafting and creates potential 
conflicts should the provision overstep the bounds of corporate 
responsibility for indemnification.70 
67. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1995. 
68. See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 351, 182 A.2d 
647, 652 (1962) (Chancellor was troubled by "the unhealthy consequence of placing a 
director in the position where he would be assured of indemnification if he settled but 
would run the risk of paying his own attorney if he unsuccessfully resisted the action"); 
Bishop, supra note 66, at 1082-83. 
69. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr. § 5 (1967). 
70. Courts have demonstrated a willingness to invalidate directors' attempts to in-
demnify themselves pursuant to bylaw or charter provisions. See Teren v. Howard, 322 
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Both mandatory and permissive statutes may be further sub-
divided based upon whether they grant exclusive or nonexclusive 
methods of indemnification. An exclusive statute permits indem-
nification only as expressly provided in · the statute. Under 
nonexclusive statutes, corporations may be creative in devising 
methods to protect their executives. The risk of personal liabil-
ity for the executive, however, still exists under nonexclusive 
statutes, because the method devised could be rendered void if 
the corporate authorization exceeds the bounds of public policy. 
Mandatory statutes, such as those in Delaware,71 New York,72 
and Pennsylvania,7s require indemnification of reasonable litiga-
tion expenses only if the director is "successful on the merits or 
otherwise."7' To illustrate the scope of these mandatory provi-
sions, the Delaware statute enables a corporation to indemnify 
in third-party litigation against expenses, judgments, fines, and 
amounts paid in settlement. The right to indemnification in the 
case of derivative actions, though, is limited to expenses, includ-
ing attorneys' fees, provided the defendant is not found liable 
for negligence or misconduct.715 
The statutes clearly provide for indemnification when the ex-
ecutive has been "wholly" successful on the merits. Significant 
jurisdictional differences arise, however, when the executive does 
not obtain a "wholly" successful verdict.76 The New York stat-
ute, for instance, requires that the executive be entirely vindi-
cated to obtain indemnification.77 Given that the New York stat-
ute is exclusive, a corporation likely could not even indemnify 
F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963) (efforts of directors to idemnify themselves for expenses in-
curred in derivative litigation held invalid); SEC v. Continental Growth Fund, (1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Essential En-
terprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (1962) (board resolution 
held invalid as an effort to idemnify themselves for counsel fees incurred in a court-
approved settlement). 
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1974). 
72. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 724(a) (McKinney 1963). 
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(c) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982). 
74. The "successful on the merits" language requires that the executive seeking in-
demnification be found either not guilty in a criminal case or not liable in a civil case. 
See Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 413. The "or otherwise" statutory language con-
templates that indemnification may be available where the action was dismissed with 
prejudice, for whatever reason. Id. In contrast, California requires success on the merits 
for mandatory indemnification, CAL. CORP. CODE§ 317(d) (West Supp. 1981); see Heyler, 
Indemnification of Corporate Agents, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1255 (1976), although non-
meritorious termination would not preclude indemnification if the defendant fell within 
the permissive provisions of the statute. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 317(c)(l) (West Supp. 1981). 
75. If the defendant is adjudged liable for misconduct or negligence, the court has 
discretion to award indemnity for expenses. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1974). 
76. Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, ~t 413. 
77. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW. §§ 724(a), 725(a) (McKinney 1963). 
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permissively in this instance. 78 
This signifies an apparent disadvantage of the New York stat-
ute in comparison with those of other jurisdictions. Under the 
California, Delaware, and Pennsylvania enactments, for exam-
ple, executives are entitled to indemnification "to the extent" of 
success. The Delaware statute explicitly provides for partial in-
demnity upon partial success,79 even should the success not bear 
upon the merits of the case. 80 
This disadvantage, however, may be more illusory than real. 
In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson,81 the Delaware 
Superior Court held that partial dismissal of charges of perjury, 
obstruction of justice, and fraud would not entitle the defendant 
executives to indemnification for legal fees. Despite the Dela-
ware statutory provisions supporting indemnification in this 
context, the court concluded that it would be "anomalous in-
deed, and diametrically opposed to the spirit and purpose of the 
[indemnification] statute and sound public policy to extend the 
benefits of indemnification to these defendants under the facts 
and circumstances of this case."82 Thus, the common law princi-
ple that public policy bars enforcement of indemnification con-
tracts where parties have engaged in fraudulent or willful mis-
conduct serves as a gloss upon the limitations established 
explicitly by the indemnification statutes. 83 
78. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 2000; Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 414. 
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1974); see Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. 
Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). 
80. See Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, et 414. Under the California statute, in or-
der to gain partial indemnification, the defendant must partially succeed on the merits. 
Id. 
81. 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970). 
82. Id. at 360. In a subsequent phase of the same case, however, the court did allow 
partial indemnification for expenses arising from criminal charges that had been dis-
missed. 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). 
Public policy always has been an oveniding limitation on the interpretation and appli-
cation of state indemnification statutes. In Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 
N.E.2d 819 (1954), for instance, the New York Court of Appeals denied indemnification 
to a successful defendant in a stockholders' suit, dismissed on the basis of plaintiff's 
participation in an alleged conspiracy to waste corporate assets, where the defendant had 
been an equal participant in the scheme. Similarly, in People v. Uran Mining Corp., 13 
A.D.2d 419, 216 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1961), a director successful on the merits nonetheless was 
denied indemnification for the defense of a suit alleging fraudulent conduct in securities 
transactions, because the defendant had at least participated in the transactions and had 
breached his fiduciary responsibility of good faith. 
83. See Kansas City Operating Corp. v. Durwood, 278 F.2d 354, 358 (8th Cir. 1960) 
(indemnitee found in pari delicto with the indemnitor); Pruet v. Dugger-Holmes & As-
socs., 162 So. 2d 613 (Ala. 1964); Johnston, supra note 25, et 2006-07. 
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C. Statutory Recovery and the Requisite Standard of 
Conduct 
The corporate executive can incur substantial expenses, such 
as attorneys' fees, fines, and settlement costs, whenever named 
as a def end ant in a derivative suit. The statutes permit the exec-
utive defendant in derivative suits, however, to seek recovery 
only of litigation expenses; indemnification of the judgment 
would merely circulate the indemnity amount back to the in-
jured corporation in the form of damages without making the 
corporation whole.8 ' Under the Delaware and Pennsylvania stat-
utes, a court has discretion to indemnify an executive against 
expenses, including attorneys' fees, arising from the defense of a 
derivative suit, notwithstanding a finding of misconduct. The 
New York statute, in contrast, does not permit the court to 
grant indemnification if it finds that the executive engaged in 
misconduct. 85 
The statutes enable permissive indemnification by the corpo-
ration in derivative actions under a strict standard of conduct, 
requiring the defendant to have acted in good faith and in the 
corporate interest. 86 While the business judgment rule will pro-
vide limited protection to executives for mere errors in judg-
ment, it will not insulate from liability the executive who fails to 
exercise due diligence. The executive who fails to ascertain the 
facts necessary to enable reasoned decisionmaking falls short of 
the standard of conduct necessary for permissive 
indemnification. 87 
The standard of care required for indemnification in third-
party and status suits is generally more liberal because the de-
fendant executive owes a duty not to the corporation, but rather 
to other aggrieved parties. Under the restrictive New York and 
California statutes, indemnification requires a good-faith, rea-
sonable belief that the conduct was in the best interest of the 
corporation. 88 The broader language of the Delaware and Penn-
sylvania enactments permits indemnification when an officer has 
acted "in or not opposed to" the best interests of the corpora-
84. See Bishop, supra note 12, at 841. 
85. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). 
86. See CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 317(c) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) 
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982). 
87. See Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 418. 
88. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 723(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); CAL. CoRP. CODE§ 
317(b) (West Supp. 1981). 
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tion,89 thus more readily enabling indemnification where, for in-
stance, liability is based on status.90 
In contrast to the derivative action, where only litigation ex-
penses are recoverable, the statutes empower the unsuccessful 
executive in a third-party action to seek indemnification as well 
for judgments, amounts paid in settlement, and fines. The New 
York statute is exceptional in its treatment of expenses incurred 
from threatened litigation: the executive can be indemnified for 
these costs in third-party but not derivative suits.91 Most other 
statutes provide for the advancement of litigation expenses even 
in threatened derivative suits. While advancement of funds ap-
pears proper in third-party actions, though, the concept seems 
self-defeating when the corporation effectively subsidizes the de-
fendant executive - its party opponent. This apparent circular-
ity of funds is mitigated, however, by provisions that the ad-
vances are to be repaid upon a determination that the 
indemnification is improper.92 
The courts carefully evaluate the propriety of indemnification 
in status liability actions. Because status cases generally are 
brought pursuant to ·federal securities laws, these laws have 
played a major role in limiting indemnification. 93 In general, the 
stance of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been that 
indemnification would reduce the ability of the federal provi-
sions to deter negligent or reckless misconduct in the issuance, 
purchase, or sale of securities.9 ' This approach is exemplified in 
Securities Act rule 460, permitting the SEC to refuse accelera-
tion of the effective date of registration statements required in 
public distributions, unless there has been a waiver of indemnifi-
cation with respect to the proposed offering, or unless the par-
ties obtain a judicial ruling that indemnification would not of-
fend public policy. 85 
89. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(a) (Purdon 
Supp. 1981-1982). 
90. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1997. 
91. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 722, 723 (McKinney 1963); Johnston, supra note 25, 
at 2001. 
92. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 722(b)(l) & (2), 723(a) (McKinney 1963). 
93. See Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(underwriter's actual knowledge of omission of material from prospectus prevented en-
forcement of indemnification provisions of the underwriting agreement), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 913 (1970); In re Equity Funding Corp., 416 F. Supp. 132, 156 (C.D. Cal. 1975); 
Odette v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gould v. American 
Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 
F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1831 (2d ed. 1961). 
94. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 2008. 
95. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1981). Rule 460 contains no prohibition, however, against 
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Whether SEC policy would invalidate broadly worded, per-
missive state indemnification statutes remains unresolved.98 The 
Delaware statute, for instance, does not require that the execu-
tive seeking indemnity have acted in the corporate interest, and 
expressly contemplates indemnification where the executive is 
sued by reason of serving as a director or officer of another cor-
poration. 97 SEC policy likely would dictate that the Delaware 
statute spans too broadly in both these regards.98 
The most satisfactory approach to assessing the propriety of 
indemnification would be through reference to the purposes of 
the federal statute involved. If the federal securities statutes aim 
primarily to compensate the defrauded investor, the interest in 
enabling defendant executives to present a strong defense would 
argue for permitting indemnification. On the other hand, indem-
nification should not be allowed if the statutes are mainly puni-
tive; the faithless fiduciary would not. be adequately punished if 
indemnified. 99 
D. Determination of Whether the Standard of Conduct Has 
Been Met 
An independent arbiter must make the determination whether 
the statutory standard of conduct required for indemnification 
has been satisfied. The Delaware and Pennsylvania statutes both 
provide for this determination to be made by a majority of disin-
terested directors constituting a quorum, the stockholders, or, 
indemnification for the expenses of a successful defense. Johnston, supra note 25, at 
2009 & n.55. See also Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (holding that federal public policy precludes indemnification for violations of Se-
curities Act § 12(2), or for fraud violations creating liability under rule lOb-5); Gould v. 
American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974) (indemnification of 
conduct negligent under Securities Exchange Act § 14 would be contrary to public policy 
of securities laws), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). 
96. See Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 416. 
97. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974). 
98. Cf. Globus v. Law Research Service, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) (indemnifica-
tion agreement between issuer and underwriter, in light of actual knowledge of violation, 
is violative of public policy), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). The SEC has said that 
insurance against liabilities arising under the 1933 Act is not against public policy, re-
gardless of who bears the cost. See W. KNEPPER, supra note 11, § 16.03, at 411 & n.34. 
99. At least three cases have suggested that the federal securities laws are compensa-
tory rather than punitive, an argument supporting indemnification of the executive de-
fendant in status actions. See Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th 
Cir. 1969) (dictum), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 
291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). 
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under certain conditions, an independent legal counsel. 100 The 
California statute provides for approval of indemnification ei-
ther by a majority of disinterested directors or by court order.101 
The New York statute permits indemnification by court order, 
approval by a majority of a quorum of disinterested directors, or 
by independent legal counsel or shareholder vote if a quorum of 
directors is unavailable.102 
Various commentators have found these statutory methods of 
independent· determination to be deficient. 103 They argue that 
reliance upon indemnification decisions by disinterested direc-
tors may be unrealistic, given the inherent difficulty involved in 
asking a director to sit in judgment regarding the actions of fel-
low directors.104 The constant threat of liability for biased deci-
sions,1015 however, as well as statutorily mandated judicial and 
shareholder oversight of directors' indemnification determina-
tions, generally provide substantial safeguards against indemni-
fication awards that unduly favor the guilty director and ad-
versely affect the interests of the corporation. 
The notion that outside counsel can provide an adequate 
check upon indemnification decisions also has been attacked, be-
cause counsel chosen by the board of directors likely will not be 
truly independent of the board. Past or expected future business 
relationships between the board of directors and chosen counsel 
cast doubt upon whether this approach could produce an impar-
tial evaluation of the indemnification decision.108 
The New York provision that permits a trial court to make 
the indemnification decision seems to provide the best option. 
This approach should be adopted by more states, notwithstand-
ing the possibility that it entails some usurpation of the power 
vested in the board of directors to make business decisions. 
Court approval of indemnification determinations, coming at the 
end of conventional litigation and involving adversary parties, 
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(d) (Purdon 
Supp. 1981-1982). 
101. CAL. CoRP. CODE§§ 317(d), (e) (West Supp. 1981). California quite properly en-
sures some level of shareholder participation in the process by requiring notice to share-
holders whenever indemnification exdeeds $10,000. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1501(b)(2) (West 
Supp. 1981). 
102. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 724-725 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). 
103. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1998; Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra note 
1, at 121, 125; Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 420. 
104. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1998. 
105. See Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1942), 
atf'd mem. 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). 
106. See Johnston, supra note 25, at 1998-99; Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra 
note 1, at 121. 
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ensures disinterested decisionmaking and presents the parties in 
interest with an adequate opportunity to be heard on the propri-
ety of indemnification. 
IV. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY INSURANCE 
The perceived inadequacies of the state indemnification stat-
utes in sensitive areas such as derivative suit recoveries and cov-
erage for federal securities law violations have inspired legisla-
tures to authorize the purchase of director and officer ("D & 0") 
liability insurance.107 At common law, a corporation's purchase 
of D & 0 insurance was considered ultra vires because perceived 
entirely as a benefit to the management, with no corresponding 
advantage to the corporation.108 In authorizing the purchase of 
D & 0 insurance, the state legislatures overcame this common 
law objection by finding that this insurance benefits corpora-
tions as a means of attracting executive talent. 
Most state statutes expressly empower a corporation to insure 
executives against liabilities, regardless of whether the corpora-
tion itself could indemnify those liabilities. Thus, the standard 
D & 0 policy might cover liability arising from damage awards, 
settlements, and all manner of litigation expenses. Indeed, state 
statutes provide specific authorization for insuring liabilities 
107. Forty-two states have adopted such statutes. See ALA. CODE § 10-21-64a(g) 
(1975); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.0l0(g) (Supp. 1981); AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005.G 
(1977); ARK. STAT. § 64-309(G) (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(i) (West Supp. 1981); 
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-lOl(l)(o)(VII) (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320a(f) 
(West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014(8) 
(Harrison 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-717(g) (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-35(h) 
(Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-5(g) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, U 157.42-12(g) 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); IND. CODE § 23-1-2-2(10) (1976); lowA CODE ANN. § 
496A.4.19.g (West Supp. 198i-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305(g) (1974); Kv. REv. 
STAT. § 271A.025(7) (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83.F (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 719(6) (Supp. 1980); Mo. CORP & Ass'NS ANN. § 2-418(k) (Supp. 1981); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 67 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1979); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 
450.1567 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.095, subd. 7 (West 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
351.355(7) (Vernon Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15)(i) (Supp. 1981); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(9) (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 727 (McKinney 
Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-19(c) (1975); Omo REV. CODE § 1701.13(E)(3) 
(Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.43a(g) (West Supp. 1980-1981); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 57.260(4) (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1410.G (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS§ 7.1-1.4.l(g) (1969); S.C. CODE§ 33-13-180(d) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-406 
(1979); TEx. Bus. CORP. Ac::r ANN. art. 2.02(16) (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16.10-
4(0)(7) (1953); VA. CODE § 13.1-3.l(g) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
23A.08.025(11) (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(g) (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 
180.05(7) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-105.l(f) (Supp. 1981). 
108. Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 420. 
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arising from status actions.1O0 Although the broad scope of D & 
0 policies has been severely criticized as insuring every species 
of fiduciary misconduct, D & 0 policy exclusions - including 
claims arising from defamation, insider self-dealing, unautho-
rized compensation, fraud, and failure to protect corporate as-
sets110 - ameliorate the potential for abuse. 
D & 0 insurance contracts generally consist of two parts. 
First, they include provisions for reimbursing the corporation for 
payments made to insured parties when the corporation is re-
quired or permitted to indemnify pursuant to statutory provi-
sions. 111 Second, policies allow for direct indemnification by the 
insurance company in situations where the corporation lacks au-
thority, under its bylaws or under state law, to indemnify the 
executive. The authorization to insure executive liability, how-
ever, is not absolute: the New York statute, for instance, bars 
any payment other than defense costs if a final adjudication es-
tablishes that the executive has engaged in active and deliberate 
dishonesty or has gained an advantage from the wrongdoing.112 
Moreover, most policies contain substantial deductible amounts 
and have co-insurance provisions requiring insureds to bear a 
percentage of any loss incurred. 113 The co-insurance and deduct-
ible features of D & 0 policies further public policy by creating 
disincentives for wrongful conduct, but could be circumvented 
by a well-drafted bylaw permitting reimbursement by the corpo-
ration to the executive.114 
A. D & 0 Insurance and Public Policy 
A major policy objection arises in the face of extensive D & 0 
liability insurance: executives may be effectively insulated from 
the deterrent effects of potential and actual litigation. Professor 
Bishop, recognizing the need for deterrence of corporate misbe-
havior, has argued that an insurance policy indemnifying an ex-
109. Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 566-68; Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 
421. 
110. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 577-78. 
111. The policy would not cover liabilities incurred by the corporation itself. See 
Johnston, supra note 25, at 2013. 
112. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727(b)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). In addition, the 
statute specifically mandates that shareholders receive notice of informatioii regarding 
the insurance, including the date of purchase, carrier, costs, and executive positions in-
sured. Id. § 727(d). 
113. 1980 WYA1T SURVEY, supra note 3, at 54. 
114. D & 0 policy limitations vary with the situation at risk, but in 1979 averaged 
about $10 million for the Fortune-listed companies. Id. at 27. 
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ecutive for breaches of the duties of good faith and due care 
should be considered an inherently impermissible act - because 
it would be tantamount to an employment contract proclaiming 
that the executive owed no fiduciary duty to the corporation.11G 
D & 0 insurance policies have come under blistering attack for 
enabling a circumvention of state policy by indemnifying risks 
which state indemnification statutes would not permit corpora-
tions to indemnify absent insurance. At least one state legisla-
ture has found this reasoning persuasive; Minnesota has adopted 
a statute barring a corporation's purchase of insurance covering 
risks which the corporation may not otherwise indemnify.118 At 
bottom, this reflects the sentiment that management should not 
be permitted to avoid fiduciary responsibilities through insur-
ance purchased by the corporation. 
In defense of D & 0 policies, most exclude from coverage a 
substantial portion of those activities that the corporation could 
not indemnify on its own.117 While numerous D & 0 policies 
· provide a measure of protection against judgments or settle-
ments in derivative actions, for instance, most exclude from cov-
erage the indemnification of fines or penalties, and claims arising 
from dishonest activities or illegal personal gains. 118 Thus, to 
some extent, the D & 0 insurance carriers themselves have nulli-
fied the critics by requiring appropriate exclusions.119 Moreover, 
the legislative enactments under fire merely authorize corpora-
tions to pay premiums for D & 0 insurance - insurance carriers 
are not permitted to protect against risks in contravention of 
public policy. 
Another public policy issue is whether intentional conduct 
should be indemnifiable.12° Fundamental common law principles 
dictate that indemnifying against liability due to a willful wrong 
is void as against public policy.121 Certain commentators have 
asserted, however, that insurance coverage for intentional, will-
115. Bishop, supra note 66, at 1091. 
116. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301-095, subd. 7 (1969). An alternative approach to the re-
sponse seen in Minnesota would be to require corporate executives to purchase their own 
insurance, mirroring the systems used in the medical and legal professions. Forcing exec-
utives to pay their own premiums would separate their personal interests from the busi-
ness interests of the corporation. But cf. Note, Indemnification of Directors, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 1429 (1963) (if individuals purchase insurance, there will be a loss of the economies 
of scale available when a corporation purchases insurance for many executives). 
117. See text accompanying note 109 supra. 
118. See Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra note 1, at 110. 
119. See note 98 supra. 
120. Scienter assumes increased significance since its recent establishment as an ele-
ment in l0h-5 offenses. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
121. See Johnston, supra, note 25, at 2024; Note, supra note 116, at 648. 
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ful, fraudulent, or criminal conduct should be permitted where 
the deterrent effect of potential liability is minimal. 122 Indeed, 
the common law supports this proposition to some extent, per-
mitting indemnification of a corporate agent acting in the corpo-
rate interest without knowledge of illegality, even should the 
agent be found criminally liable for the conduct.123 Additionally, 
there exists adequate support for the notion that attorneys' fees 
arising out of intentional or criminal conduct should be indem-
nifiable. In Commissioner v. Tellier, 12' the Supreme Court held 
that a broker - heavily fined for a deliberate violation of the 
federal securities laws - could deduct for tax puuposes the 
costs of his unsuccessful defense as an "ordinary and necessary" 
business expense. The Court reasoned that the public interest in 
encouraging effective representation justified the allowance of 
the deduction for litigation expenses, notwithstanding strong 
federal interests in discouraging violations of the securities 
laws.1211 In at least some instances, therefore, Tellier should per-
mit D & 0 insurance carriers to promote effective representation 
by indemnifying executives for defense expenses.126 
A further question is whether public policy should tolerate the 
indemnification of punitive damages. Admittedly, the deterrent 
force of punitive damages will be substantially diminished if the 
defendant. executive can seek reimbursement from the insurance 
carrier. Yet, when compared with the threat of criminal liability 
for corporate wrongdoing, punitive damages have only marginal 
deterrent impact; if criminal penalties fail to deter executive 
wrongdoers, the imposition of punitive damages likely will not 
have significant incremental eff ect.127 Indeed, various jurisdic-
tions that·permit indemnification of fines and penalties - sanc-
tions closely akin to punitive damages - seemingly have found 
no public policy obstacle to reimbursement of punitive 
damages.128 
122. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 583. 
123. See Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, supra note 1, at 124. 
124. 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
125. Id. at 694. 
126. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 584; Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, 
supra note 1, at 124. 
127. Where the insurance policy does not explicitly exclude punitive damages from 
its coverage, there may be substantial judicial reluctance to interfere with the bargain 
struck between the insurer and the insured. See Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793 (Pa. 
Super. 1966); Mattar & Hilson, supra note 61, at 422. 
128. See DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 723 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1980-1981) (expenses, judgments, fines); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410(a) (Pur-
don Supp. 1981-1982). Treble damages for civil antitrust violations are probably indem-
nifiable in whole or in part. See Greenberg & Dean, supra note 6, at 586. 
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V. THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION: RISK-
SHIFTING. OR IMMUNIZATION? 
A. The Compensation Fallacy 
Corporations and their executives frequently contend that 
shifting the risk of legal liability from corporate officers to the 
enterprise is a legitimate means of corporate compensation. The 
rationale has been that executives can be compensated through 
salary, bonus, or other emoluments, in whatever form.129 From 
this perspective, indemnification represents merely another 
fringe benefit, to be grouped with executive expense accounts, 
profit-sharing plans, stock options, and deferred compensation 
plans.1ao 
But in fact, indemnity lacks the essential attributes of com-
pensation. In contrast to the common law requirement that com-
pensation be reasonably related to "past services rendered,"181 
129. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 1, at 5. 
130. On expense accounts, see Rothschild & Soberheim, Expense Accounts for Exec-
utives, 67 YALE L.J. 1363 (1958). 
Share options are granted to management as an incentive to increase efficiency, which 
is reflected in stock price appreciation, thereby rendering the option more valuable. See 
Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Stock purchase plans offer 
shares at favorable prices to employees to encourage responsible conduct by increasing 
their ownership interests. See generally 2 G. WASHINGTON & V.H. ROTHSCHILD, supra 
note 13, at 613-33. Deferred compensation plans include pensions and annuities in which 
cash payments are made after peak income years for the purpose of preventing the sums 
from being taxed at the employees' current graduated rate. See generally E. WooD &,J. 
CERNY, TAX ASPECTS OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 15-97 (2d ed. 1969). Fringe benefits 
may include life insurance, health and accident insurance, club membership, substantial 
discounts on corporate products, home-financing programs, moving expenses, medical ex-
aminations, educational opportunities, recreational facilities, guest homes, conventions, 
health resorts, limousines and chauffeurs, as well as yachts and crews. See generally 
Larkin v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968); H. HENN, supra note 23, at§ 254; 1 
G. WASHINGTON & V.H. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 13, at 165-202. 
131. See McNulta v. Corn B.elt Bank, 164 Ill. 427, 45 N.E. 954 (1897); Stratis v. An-
dreson, 254 Mass. 536, 150 N.E. 832 (1926); Miner 'V. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 
N.W. 218 (1892); Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 586 
(1922); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147 (1947). 
Where compensation is excessive, the recipients, as well as the directors granting the 
windfall, are liable for the excess amounts, absent a meritorious defense of sound busi-
ness judgment. See Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Dunlap, 269 
Ala. 97, 111 So. 2d 1 (1959); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), atf'd mem., 263 
A.D. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941), motion for leave to appeal denied, 263 A.D. 852, 32 
N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1942). Moreover, compensation should be predetermined because retro-
active compensation for past services is regarded as a grant without consideration, and 
thereby actionable by shareholders as a waste of corporate assets. See Glenmore Distil-
leries v. Seidman, 267 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 
159 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 828 (1947); Spaeth v. Journal Printing Co., 
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the legality of indemnification is determined by statutes, and the 
amount of indemnification is based upon actual costs incurred 
rather than upon a standard of reasonableness. Further, the ex-
ecutive function creating an indemnifiable liability need not 
have been performed for the benefit of the corporation - an 
essential prerequisite for any executive compensation.132 Addi-
tionally, in most situations where a corporation offers indemnifi-
cation as an inducement to newly hired executives, the question 
does not even arise as to how the offered indemnification relates 
to past services rendered by the executive-beneficiary. Finally, 
indemnification differs from compensation because indemnities 
are not given at fixed intervals in agreed-upon amounts. In fact, 
there may be no occasion for indemnification in any given year, 
or indeed in the entire span, of the executive-beneficiary's ten-
ure with the corporation. 
The conclusion that indemnification cannot be equated with 
executive compensation draws support from the approach taken 
by state and federal statutes. State corporation laws do not clas-
sify indemnification as a form of compensation;138 similarly, the 
Securities and Ex~hange Commission does not require the dis-
closure of indemnification payments in proxy statements, while 
maldng executive compensation a matter of mandatory 
disclosure.184 
139 F. Supp. 188, 16 Alaska 149 (D. Alaska 1956); Heise v. Earnshaw Publications, Inc., 
130 F. Supp. 38 (D. Mass. 1955); Beacon Wool Corp. v. Johnson, 331 Mass. 274, 119 
N.E.2d 195 (1954); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914). 
The rule preventing salary compensation for past services does have exceptions: where 
an implied contract exists, Landstreet v. Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 29 So. 2d 653 (1947); 
where bonuses customarily are paid to executives at year's-end, Wineburgh v. Seeman 
Bros., 21 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup. Ct, 1940); where the amount awarded is for the reasonable 
value of services rendered, Wiseman v. Musgrave, 309 Mich. 523, 16 N.W.2d 60 (1944); or 
where the compensation is ratified by the stockholders, Chambers v. Beaver-Advance · 
Corp., 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958); c/. Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 
113, 81 A. 136 (1911) (ratification was voidable because interested officers impermissibly 
had voted for ratification). Ratification of retroactive compensation is impermissible 
where the result or purpose would be to defraud the corporation, the minority sharehold-
ers, or other unprotected interests. Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 828 (1947). However, numerous cases hold that an officer or 
director may recover the reasonable value of extraordinary services rendered to a corpo-
ration upon an implied promise to pay for the services. E.g., Corinne Mill, Canal & Stock 
Co. v. Toponce, 152 U.S. 405 (1894); Fitzgerald & Mallory Constr. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 
U.S. 98 (1890); Denman v. Richardson, 292 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1923); Navco Hardwood Co. 
v. Bass, 214 Ala. 553, 108 So. 452 (1925); Mortensen v. Ballard, 218 Ark. 459, 236 S.W.2d 
1006 (1951). See generally 19 AM. Jua. 2D Corporations § 1401 (1965). 
132. See New York Dry Dock Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. 
Ct. 1939); Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N;E. 818 (1914). 
133. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Ac-r § 33 (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 
701 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). 
134. Proxy disclosure of executive compensation on Securities Exchange Act schedule 
124 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:1 
B. Indemnification as Immunity 
The judicially developed doctrine of governmental immu-
nity13G is functionally equivalent to corporate indemnification. 
While governmental immunity insulates officials performing cer-
tain governmental functions from the threat of litigation, corpo-
rate indemnification likewise shields executives through the re-
imbursement of expenses. 138 
The immunity granted to public officials thus bars the lawsuit 
at its inception; the court must inquire only whether the con-
duct at issue falls within the immunized categories of govern-
mental functions. In contrast, the "functional immunity" pro-
vided by indemnification does not prevent the lawsuit, but 
rather neutralizes its consequences. The inquiry for the grantor 
of indemnity parallels the court's inquiry into governmental im-
munity: whether the executive wrongdoing comes within an in-
demnifiable category of corporate function. 
Both indemnification and immunity spring · forth from the 
identical fountain of necessity. The common law postulate that 
public servants require protection in order to engage in essential 
decisionmaking applies with full force to corporate executives, as 
evidenced by the frantic efforts of corporations to procure state 
indemnification statutes after the McCollum decision.137 The 
need for indemnification to attract qualified managers to execu-
tive positions resembles, in certain respects, the need for govern-
mental immunity with respect to officers who may not enjoy the 
alluring salaries and privileges provided their corporate counter-
parts. Given the commonality of the two doctrines, a comparison 
of the protection afforded by each suggests that the corporate 
executive has been overinsulated. 
14A mandates only the listing of salary and benefits, contingent remuneration, and stock 
gains accrued by the exercise of options and appreciation rights. See How Much Does 
the Boss Make?, FORBES, June 8, 1981, at 114. The SEC does require indemnification 
disclosure on form 10-K, item 11, but only concerning the availability of the indemnity, 
not the amounts or the recipients. 
135. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT § 26 (1972 & Supp. 1980). 
136. One very significant difference between governmental immunity and corporate 
indemnification arises from the perspective of the plaintiff: an injured party will receive 
compensation from the wrongdoing executive who later receives indemnification from 
the corporation, but there will be no compensation available should a government official 
be able to assert qualified immunity as a defense. This Article, however, focuses upon 
indemnity and immunity from the perspective of the protected officer or executive, 
rather than from the perspective _of damage-seeking plaintiffs. 
137. See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra. 
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C. The Waning Immunity of Public Officials 
The Supreme Court's approach in Barr v. Matteo138 exempli-
fies the traditional common law rule that public officials acting 
in their traditional governmental capacities should be absolutely 
immune from personal liability. The acting director of a federal 
agency had been sued for malicious defamation allegedly com-
mitted in issuing a press release announcing the plaintiff's sus-
pension for misconduct. A plurality139 of the Court found the 
press release to be within the outer perimeters of the director's 
line of duty, and therefore accorded the defendant - an officer 
of high rank exercising a discretionary function - absolute im-
munity from tort liability for defamation.140 The Court relied 
heavily upon the sentiment, expressed previously by Judge 
Learned Hand, that it would be "better to leave unredressed the 
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try 
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."141 
Beginning with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,142 however, courts began shifting 
away from the absolute immunity rule. In Bivens, where federal 
narcotics agents were held liable for conducting a warrantless 
search in violation of the fourth amendment, the court held that 
federal officials committing constitutional torts would enjoy only 
a qualified immunity from suit, which would depend upon a de-
fendant's good-faith belief in the lawfulness of the conduct.143 
138. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
139. The 5-4 decision consisted of a plurality opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, joined 
by three other Justices. Mr. Justice Black concurred in a separate opinion which empha-
sized the public interest in encouraging federal employees to express ideas concerning 
the proper operation of government. 
140. 360 U.S. at 574-75; see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). In Spalding, the 
Postmaster General was sued for circulating among postmasters a notice that defamed 
the plaintiff and interfered with his contractual relationships. The issue was raised 
whether the malicious motive of the officer would render that officer liable in damages 
for injury inflicted by his conduct that otherwise was within the scope of his authority. 
The Court concluded that the head of a department could not be held liable in a civil 
suit for damages on account of official communications made by him with respect to 
matters within his authority. The Postmaster General issuing th~ circulars "did not ex-
ceed his authority, nor pass the line of his duty .••• The motive that impelled him to do 
that of which the plaintiff complains is therefore wholely immaterial." Id. at 499. 
141. Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1948). 
142. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). 
143. Id. at 1346; see Tritsis v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1974) (Internal Reve-
nue Service employees in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms charged with 
violations of the fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth amendments granted qualified im-
munity); State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (customs 
officers granted qualified immunity). 
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Further erosion of the principle of absolute immunity occurred 
in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 144 where the Governor of Ohio and officers 
of Kent State University were sued for damages under the Civil 
_ Rights Act.1411 The Court ruled that officers of the executive 
branch would be immune from suit only if they could demon-
strate the existence of a reasonable good-faith belief in the pro-
priety of their official conduct "formed at the time and in light 
of all the circumstances. "148 
In Butz v. Economou, 147 the Court jettisoned the principle of 
absolute immunity, substituting a general rule of qualified im-
munity for high-level government executives. In a damage action 
brought against the Secretary of Agriculture for alleged viola-
tions of due process occurring during an administrative proceed-
ing, the Court rejected the Secretary's contention that high-
ranking officials needed absolute immunity in order to perform 
their official functions free from the fear of unending litigation. 
Rather, the Court concluded that only limited or qualified im-
munity was necessary to ensure the uninhibited exercise of gov-
ernmental functions. Thus, the Court held that executive offi-
cials, in general, were entitled only to the qualified immunity set 
forth in Scheurer, and that "federal officials who seek absolute 
exemption from personal liability ... [would] bear the burden 
of showing that public policy requires . an exemption of that 
scope . . . [because] essential for the conduct of the public 
business. "148 
This clear trend towards providing lesser protection from lia-
bility to employees operating at the highest levels of government 
raises the dilemma that the legitimate desire for subjecting gov-
ernment officials to tort liability may inhibit some conscientious 
public officers from making decisions that would be in the public 
interest. The ultimate resolution of this conflict in values likely 
will be to shift liability, at least to some extent, from public offi-
cials to governmental units, in much the same manner that lia-
bility of the corporate executive has been absorbed by the corpo-
ration through indemnification. 149 
144. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
145. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1976). 
146. 416 U.S. at 247-48. 
147. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
148. Id. at 506-07. 
149. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. 
L. REv. 209, 216-17 (1963) (arguing for indemnification of government officers acting rea-
sonably or in good faith). 
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D. Should Corporate Executives Enjoy Greater Immunity 
From Liability than Cabinet Officers of the Federal 
Government? 
The Supreme Court's decision in Economou provides a useful 
framework for ·assessing the concept of corporate indemnifica-
tion. Economou suggests that a corporate executive should have 
some measure of immunity from liability, similar to that pro-
vided the government executive, to ensure effective decision-
making. But in fact, indemnification insurance provides the cor-
porate executive with substantially more protection from 
personal liability than the government official obtains through 
the narrow doctrine of qualified immunity. 
In Economou, the Court made clear that the burden would 
rest upon the official seeking insulation from liability to show 
why public policy warranted more than a qualified immunity 
from suit.1110 Extending this reasoning to the corporate sphere, 
there seems little justification in public policy for providing the 
corporate executive with the functional equivalent of absolute 
immunity; indeed, considerations of policy suggest, if anything, 
that government officials should be provided a higher degree of 
protection from liability than their corporate counterparts. Gov-
ernment officials operating at the Cabinet level make far-reach-
ing decisions that affect the health, safety, and security of mil-
lions of persons, while corporate executives normally face purely 
financial questions influencing a narrower range of interests. 
Moreover, the potential liability for faulty corporate decisions 
can more readily be foreseen and quantified than the liability for 
improper government decisions. In light of these differences, 
highly situated government officials seemingly deserve more, not 
less, protection from personal liability than do corporate 
executives.1111 
If, as Economou indicates, absolute immunity from personal 
liability is not indispensable to effective decisionmaking, the 
150. See text accompanying note 148 supra. 
151. A counterargument could be made here that government officials should have 
less protection from personal liability precisely because their decisions frequently will 
have broader impact. Thus, the argument runs, a greater scope of personal liability 
would induce greater caution among officials making these important decisions. In fact, 
however, increased personal liability in many instances does not lead to greater caution 
in decisionmaking, but rather merely disrupts government functions. See Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U.S. 478, 522 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (requiring Cabinet-level 
officials to defend actions on the merits represents a tremendous consumption of effort 
and is contrary to the best interests of the people). 
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question arises why corporate executives have obtained such 
favorable treatment. The burgeoning of corporate indemnifica-
tion seems due in large part to the lack of public debate on the 
issue, which stems in turn from the paucity of available informa-
tion regarding the :financial and social costs of indemnification. 
Many state statutes whitewash the informational problems by 
permitting corporations to provide for corporate indemnification 
that exceeds any explicit statutory authorization, without re-
quiring disclosure of the essence of indemnt:fication- agreements. 
The failure of states to mandate disclosure of these agreements 
creates a significant obstacle to shareholders seeking to chal-
lenge the propriety of indemnification in questionable transac-
tions. Corporate executives have been ingenious in suppressing 
information concerning the extent to which they defend them-
selves, at the shareholder's expense, from the consequences of a 
breach of duty or even gross mismanagement of the corporation. 
Under the Economou rationale, corporations and their execu-
tives should bear the burden of demonstrating why a qualified 
immunity, analogous to federal executive immunity, does not 
adequately protect officers who in good faith pursue legitimate 
corporate interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of corporate indemnification has been transformed 
from its common law traditions into a doctrine which readily 
permits a corporation to protect executives who engage in self-
serving conduct having no benefit to the corporation or its. 
shareholders. Director and officer liability insurance has been 
widely used to circumvent even the least stringent limitations on 
indemnification imposed by state statutes and judicial decisions. 
Corporate officers enjoy effectively an absolute immunity from 
liability, while in contrast, government executives receive only a 
qualified immunity. Given that government executives make de-
cisions more significant than their corporate counterparts, this 
disparity in immunity is counterintuitive and demonstrates the 
need to reduce the scope of corporate indemnification. 
State and federal agencies responsible for regulating corporate 
conduct should take the initiative in compelling public disclo-
sure of information concerning corporate indemnification. Pub-
licly available information on indemnification practices will be 
the key to meaningful reform in this neglected but sensitive area 
of corporatio~ law. 
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